





SPP1500: Hardware and Platforms:

- MIMODeS: Christina Gimmler-Dumont, Stefan Weithoffer, Norbert Wehn
- LIFT: Michael Balszun, Veit Kleeberger, Samarjit Chakraborty, Ulf Schlichtmann
- ARES: Johannes Maximilian Kühn, Wolfgang Rosenstiel

SPP1500.itec.kit.edu




Resilience Articulation Point (RAP) Model





Principal RAP Pillars

- Fault from various physical effects, if not masked, will manifest as permanent or transient single or multi-bit **invalidations**
- Probabilistic error functions are used to encapsulate and model different physical effects resulting in bit-flips
- Transformation functions convert probabilistic error functions towards higher abstraction levels
- Error and transformation functions aren't integral parts of the RAP model



System Failure Analysis

Technology Level (Fault) Model



Device parameters,
Cosmic radiation,
NBTI, SEU/SET,
thermal stress, ...

Induced
charge
distribution

Q_{crit}

Calculation of
Bit flip probability
(temporal / spatial)

System Level


Instruction Level

RT Level


Circuit Level

Technology Level



Wireless Communication System




Modified QoS Communication Flow



Hardware Error Mitigation Space



Memory Errors MAT_H





- Inherent system error resilience below memory error rate 10^{-4}

Memory Resilience Actuators MAT_H

resilience actuator	impacts	robustness against supply voltage variations	(dis-)advantages
algorithmic error resilience	area +0% power +0% throughput -0%	-200mV supply voltage	
1 outer iteration	area +0% power +0% throughput -75%	-300mV supply voltage	+ requires no change of existing hardware architecture + dynamic - throughput loss and reduction of energy efficiency
1-bit error correction code	area +30% power +30% throughput -0%	-400mV supply voltage	- static area and power increase + corrects all single bit flips
8T memory cells	area +25% power +0% throughput -0%	-400mV supply voltage	- static area increase + very robust
hybrid 6T/8T memory cells	for DEC_IN area +5% power +0% throughput -0%		+ low area increase - detailed characterization of each memory mandatory




Hardware Error Mitigation Space



System Failure Analysis

Virtual Prototype of a two-wheeled robot



System Level





Instruction Level

RT Level

Circuit Level


Technology Level

Qualitative Evaluation



System Failure Analysis

Error Probabilities for 10 seconds simulated real-time



N: Nominal

V: Hardened by +10% VDD

A: Hardened by double area per cell

P: 1-bit parity and write-through mode

ARES Project

Challenge

Increasing reliability costs for SoCs

Proposed Solution

Using coarse grained reconfigurable architectures (CGRAs) as reliability enhancer


Goals

- Avoid inclusion of additional circuits
 - Graceful degradation
 - Adaptive reliability




Background

CGRAs



- Array of Processing Elements (PEs)
- Interconnection network
- PE: FUs, register-set, context-memory

Benefits of CGRAs




- Fast reconfiguration mechanism
- Multi-context mapping
- Inherent redundancy



Contributions (1)


Reliability Method (1)



Hardening of the CGRA

- Low cost TMR method
 - Exploiting inherent redundancy
- Dynamic remapping
 - Adapt routing for defective PEs

Reliability Method (2)




Hardening of the SoC

- Dynamic Functional Verification (DFV) to sample hardware accelerators



Contributions (2)


SoC Prototype



Validation of the proposed methods

- Excessive simulation times
- FPGA-based SoC Prototype
- Gaisler Research SoC platform

Fault Analysis Tool




- StML (Static Mapping Library)
- Combines advantages of hardware-based and simulation-based fault injection approaches



Future Work


Cross-Layer Approach



- Hardening of the processor
- Connecting to OS/Application
- Technological methods

Conclusion

ARES Project



- Adaptive methods to secure parts of a SoC using CGRAs
- Fault simulation and analysis methods
- We aim to include methods to secure (embedded) CPUs
- We propose a comprehensive cross-layer approach